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Abstract
We examine the incentives of regions in a country to unite or to separate.
We nd that smaller regions have greater incentives to unite, relative to
larger regions. We show, however, that on the whole, majority voting
on separation and union generates excessive incentives to separate. This
leads us to examine the scope of alternative political institutions and rules
in overcoming the potential ineÆciency. Our paper also provides a wide
range of examples to illustrate the dierent institutions used in actual
practice to resolve such problems.
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1 Introduction
During the last fty years, the number of nations has increased dramatically from
74 in 1946 to 193 in 1997. Many of these countries were born out of the decolo-
nization process in Africa and in the rest of the world. Moreover, in this era more
than twenty boundaries between nations were changed, without creating or elim-
inating a nation.
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More recently, referenda have been held in many countries and
these have resulted in substantial changes in political structure (as in Northern
Ireland, Scotland and Wales in Great Britain and East Timor in Indonesia). At
the same time, we are witnessing a move towards greater integration in Europe,
which is accompanied by lowering of boundaries between countries.
In this paper, we study the role of the size of regions in determining the
incentives for separation and unication. The main questions we address are as
follows:
 Do smaller regions have the same incentives for union as compared to larger
regions and are incentives for union and separation reecting socially desir-
able outcomes?
 How do political rules inuence the incentives for union and separation
under majority voting?
When the regions dier much in size it is possible that in a union the large
region dominates or colonizes the small region. We will examine if such unequal
or unconditional union can be in the interests of the dierent regions. This is
related to the question if one should expect union of unequal size regions or equal
size regions.
To determine the inuence of size on the incentives for separation we set up
the following simple model. There are two regions, with one region being larger
than the other.
2
We assume that the regions have the same density of population.
Thus size can be interpreted in terms of population or in terms of area. These
regions can choose to be independent countries or to unite, by majority voting.
1
See The Times Atlas [1993, Plate 8] for a survey map on border changes and changes in
sovereignty since 1945.
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The notion of regions we use is quite general. We believe that similar considerations would
also apply to other political jurisdictions. To keep the text as readable as possible we will use
the terms nations and countries throughout.
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In each region, a referendum is held on union and separation. If a majority in
both regions prefers union then the outcome is union, and so there is one country.
If both regions vote for separation then there will be two countries. So in case of
disagreement, the two regions separate, i.e. the status quo outcome is separation.
After the decision on unication and separation the individuals in the region
choose the type/location of government they want to have. This determines, for
example, where the capital, the national airport, the universities and other facil-
ities are located. The model is than interpreted in a geographic dimension. The
individuals living close to the capital then have the highest payo. Seccesionist
activitities will therefore take place at the fringe of the nation: the individuals at
the fringe of a nation will live closer to the capital if the nation breaks up.
The model also has an interpretation in a preference dimension. Individu-
als who are close to each other are assumed to have the same preferred type
of government. Governments located far from individuals dier more from the
preferred type of government of these individuals than from the preferred type of
government of the individuals who are located in close proximity of the govern-
ment. The choice of the type of government, for example, can determine which
social security system will prevail. The people who live close to the capital or
equivalently, who prefer the prevailing social security system, have a higher payo
than other individuals.
In the basic model the costs of having a government are supposed to be xed:
they do not depend on the size of a nation and factors like economic development
and economic integration. The xed cost assumption leads up to the following
basic trade-o. When a region is smaller, the people in this region are more likely
to have their preferred type of government. Since the costs of government are
xed, independent of the size of the country, the tax rates will be higher in a
smaller nation than in a larger nation. When the people choose for union with
the other region, they will also pay less taxes but it is also less likely that they
have their preferred type of government.
In our model, the increase in the payo of an individual of being closer to the
public good is linear. The tax advantage for the smaller region from union is,
however, strictly decreasing and convex in its own size. For very small regions, the
tax advantage is clearly enormous and dominates the loss in political inuence.
The large region faces the reverse trade-os: the tax advantages of union are
3
increasing in the size of the smaller region. Moreover, they are also convex in the
size of the smaller region. This implies that when the smaller region is very small
then it is likely that the tax advantages are oset by the political costs. Thus
the large region prefers a union with relatively large other regions only. These
observations have the following implication: very small regions will have major
incentives to merge, but the marginal tax gain for the large region is relatively
minor and no union will take place, if the regions are very unequal in size. Thus,
union will only occur between regions which have approximately the same size.
We show that the incentives for union and separation under majority voting
do not reect social welfare accurately. This means that under majority voting
the aggregate welfare is not maximized. Individuals in the large region who are
located far from the small region have an incentive to separate to get the public
goods closer to their preferences. The individuals who are located close to the
other region have an incentive for union, but in case of separation they should
also pay more taxes. The costs of separation are thus not borne exclusively by
the individuals who are in favour of separation. Hence there exists excessive
incentives for separation: under majority voting there will be more countries
than socially desirable. This leads us to study alternative political institutions
that may help mitigate the ineÆciency.
We next examine the role of status quo in determining the nature of voting
equilibrium. It is possible that the regions which are voting on union and sep-
aration initially form a union. It is then appropriate to have separation solely
when both regions prefer separation.
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When we apply this condition, there are
still, although less, excessive incentives for separation. The decision on union
and separation can also be taken in one referendum in which individuals of both
regions participate, i.e. in a nationwide referendum. We nd that the outcome
under a nationwide referendum is the same as in the case where separation only
takes place when both regions agree on separation. This analysis suggests that
the nding that majority voting leads to too much separation is robust.
Finally, we examine the prospects of unequal union. If there are only a few
individuals in the small region then the tax burden will be very high. One way
out would be for the small region to accept unequal or unconditional union. In
3
We may interpret a national parliament deciding on break up of a nation as analogous to
a nationwide referendum on union and separation.
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this case only the large region determines the location or type of the public good.
This implies that unequal union takes place when regions dier very much in size.
This gives a simple explanation for why small islands Montserrat in the Caribean
and Bermuda in the Pacic might prefer to remain crown colonies of the United
Kingdom.
4
Our paper is a contribution to the study of country formation and secession.
There has been renewed interest in such issues in recent years, see e.g. Alesina
and Spolaore [1997], Bolton and Roland [1997], Casella and Feinstein [1990] and
Wei [1991a, 1991b]
5
In particular, our paper is closely related to the paper by
Alesina and Spolaore [1997] and Wei [1991a, 1991b].
Alesina and Spolaore [1997] study the equilibrium determination of the num-
ber (and size) of countries in dierent political regimes, in dierent economic
environments and under varying levels of economic integration. They use the
same trade-o as we use. The economic advantages of unication are compared
with the political costs of a xed-costs public good which is less close to the
preferences of local majorities. In this setting, they nd that democratization
leads to an ineÆciently large number of countries. In their analysis, the bound-
aries between nations are endogenous but they restrict attention to outcomes
with equal sized countries. In our paper, the focus is on the role of relative size
of the dierent regions. The sizes of the regions are exogenously specied; we
take them to be dened via non-economic factors such as cultural, geographic or
ethnical dierences across regions. This focus on relative region size also allows
us to examine the scope of political arrangements such as unequal union.
Wei [1991] examines a model in which the size of the regions is exogenously
specied. Moreover, he allows for the level of a public good in a nation to
vary depending on the level of economic development and the size of the nation.
4
Other examples are: small countries such as Luxembourg willing to be essentially passive
members of the NATO, Liechtenstein participating in a customs union with Switzerland using
the Swiss franc as its national currency and Puerto Rico where indigenous inhabitants are US
citizens but do not vote in US presidential elections.
5
These recent political economy papers on nations is related to the local public good
literature and of the literature on scal federalism. For the local public good theory, see
Austin [1993], Benabou [1993,1995], Bewley [1981], Epple, Filimon and Romer [1984], Epple and
Romer [1991], Fernandez and Rogerson [1994], Jehiel and Scotchmer [1995], Rubinfeld [1987],
Scotchmer [1996], Stahl and Varaiya [1983] and Tiebout [1956]. For literature on scal ferder-
alism see Alesina and Spolaore [1995], Alesina, Perotti and Spolaore [1995], Musgrave [1959],
Oates [1972], Persson and Tabellini [1992,1993,1994] and Wildasin [1988].
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The trade-o in his model is between the higher eÆciency of the public good
under union and the lower coordination costs under separation. Wei argued that
the stage of development or degree of specialization of a region inuences the
decision on union and separation. The main result involving regional size is that
a small region is more eager to secede from a unied nation than a large region,
when secession is very costly and the economy is at low levels of development.
However, as the economy develops, the small region is the rst to demand national
unication. Wei also argued that when separation and unication processes are
costly, these processes do not always take place when the situation after the
process is preferred by a majority in each region. Wei does not look at socially
desirable incomes. Our analysis diers from Wei's in that we consider a xed-
costs public good and that we use a very dierent trade-o: we compare the
eÆciency gains in terms of one as against two governments with the political
costs of greater distance to the government. In addition, we study the nature of
socially desirable outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic model.
Section 3 contains the analysis of this model, the solution to the majority voting
process and the socially optimal outcome as well as a comparison of the two
outcomes. In Section 4 we discuss the role of alternative political systems, while
Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic Model
We suppose that one public good which identies a nation (i.e. a country); we
call this public good the 'government'. The range of all possible governments is
normalized in the segment [0; 1]. The location of a government is denoted by l. In
addition, we assume that the total population has mass one and that individuals
from this population are located at ideal points, which indicates their preferred
government. The individuals are uniformly distributed on the segment [0; 1]. The
utility of each individual is decreasing with the distance from his government to
his location (i.e. his ideal point). The distance between the ideal point of a
consumer i and the government in his country is denoted by d
i
.
We assume that there will be either one or two countries (i.e. governments),
which have a xed (exogenous) boundary . The region located at the left-hand
6
side of  is called region A, and the region at the right-hand side of  is called
region B. Without loss of generality, we suppose that 0 <  < 1=2. We assume
that there is a xed cost F per country, regardless of its size
6
. This F includes
for example the costs of building airports and hospitals and the costs of having
a machinery of government. In the basic model every individual has the same,
exogenous income y, and pays the lump-sum tax t
i
.
7
Now, we can dene the
utility function for each individual i:
U(i) = g(1  ad
i
) + y   t
i
(1)
where g and a are two positive parameters. The parameter g measures the utility
of the public good when the preference distance d
i
is zero and the parameter
a measures the loss in utility if the government is farther away (i.e. when d
i
increases). The utility function is thus linear in the preference distance. For
simplicity we assume that a < 1. The parameter a can then be interpreted as
the marginal utility of a government located at a distance d
i
.
We look at the socially optimal incentives for separation and unication and
at the incentives for separation and unication under majority voting. In the
latter case we assume that separation occurs when a majority of voters is in
favour of separation in at least one region. This voting rule is realistic when the
central government is too weak or does not want to prevent secession through
military means. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union, for example, took
place after the central government could not prevent secessions.
8
The majority
voting rule is also relevant when two initial independent countries are considering
political integration which takes place only if it is favoured by a majority in each
initial country.
6
When the costs of a government depends on the size of the country, we could model the
costs as F = f + s where s denotes the size of the country. We conjecture that, as long as f
is positive, our main results will carry over.
7
Here we assume that individual wealth is equal in the two regions. We examine the case
of unequal wealth across regions in Appendix B.
8
The recent referendum in East Timor is another example of this procedure.
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3 Analysis of the basic model.
In this section we will rst examine the outcomes when decision to form one or
two countries is taken by majority voting and then we will derive the socially
optimal number of countries.
3.1 Majority voting.
In this part we will examine the case when the decision to form one or two
countries is taken by majority voting. Intuitively, it is clear that if  becomes
very small then the small region (region A) will prefer union. The per capita
cost of supporting an independent government, F=, becomes very large and
the individuals in region A will therefore benet a lot from unication. The
individuals in region B will also compare the benet of a lower tax rate under
unication with the disadvantage of a change in the location of the public good
under unication. This comparison depends in turn on the linearity of political
costs, and the convexity of the tax advantage arising out of union. We will discuss
this comparison after the proof of Proposition 1.
Our analysis of these issues is summarized in Proposition 1. We dene 
A
=
2F=ga and 
B
= 1  2F=ga.
Proposition 1. There exists numbers 
A
and 
B
such that region A prefers
union if and only if  < 
A
while region B prefers union if and only if  > 
B
.
Thus union only takes place if 
B
< 
A
and  2 [
B
; 
A
].
The rst step in the proof is to show that the preferences of the person in
the center of a region reect the majority opinions in each region perfectly. This
is the content of Lemma 1. The reasoning behind this lemma is that when the
individual in the centre of a region prefers something and when utility is linearly
decreasing with respect to location by the same rate under all alternatives then
a majority in the region shares the preference of the individual in the centre of
that region. The majority is formed by the individuals which are located either
to the left or to the right of the individual in the centre.
Lemma 1. In region A (region B) there is a majority in favour of separation if
the individual in the centre of that region wants separation.
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The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in the Appendix A. We now present the
proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1: There will be a majority in favour of union in region
A if the consumer =2 prefers union:
U
II
(

2
) = g + y  
F

< g(1  a j
1
2
 

2
j) + y   F = U
I
(

2
) (2)
That is, if
 <
2F
ga
= 
A
(3)
There is a majority in favour of union in region B if the consumer (1 + )=2
prefers union:
U
II
(
1 + 
2
) = g + y  
F
1  
< g(1  a

2
) + y   F = U
I
(
1 + 
2
) (4)
That is, if
 > 1 
2F
ga
= 1  
A
= 
B
(5)
This completes the proof.
We now return to the discussion on the eects of a lower tax rate and the dis-
advantage of a larger preference distance under unication. These two eects do
not inuence utility in the same way. The inuence of the preference distance is
linear in  but the inuence of a lower tax rate is not linear in . This is shown
in Figures 1a-1c. Figure 1a shows the trade-o for low values of F , Figure 1b
the trade-o for intermediate values of F , and Figure 1c the trade-o for high
values of F . The expressions for the tax benets and the distance costs for the
individuals in region B can be derived from inequality (4). They are F=(1   )
and ga=2, respectively.
It is straightforward to derive from inequality (2) that for region A the tax
benet of a change from separation to union is F= F while the distance costs
are ga=2  ga=2. For low values of , we see in Figure 1a, 1c and 1e a large tax
eect in region A. Region A therefore prefers union for low values of .
For region B we see in Figures 1a and 1b that for low values of  the positive
tax benets under unication is not outweighed by the costs of longer preference
distances under unication. Region B therefore prefers union for higher values
9
ga/4
1/2 1
ga/2
F
union separation
Region A
F/  - F
ga/2 - ga /2
F,g
Figure 1a: Majority voting outcomes, F<ga/4
ga/4
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1/2 1
F
separation
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F/(1- ) - F
ga /2
F,g
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ga/4
1/2 1
ga/2
F
union
Region A
F,g
F/  - F
ga/2 - ga /2
ga/4
1/2 1
F
separation
Region B
union
F,g
ga/2
F/(1- ) - F
ga /2
Figure 1b: Majority voting outcomes, ga/4<F<ga/2
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F
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F/(1- ) - F
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union
F,g
ga/2
Figure 1c: Majority voting outcomes, F>ga/2
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of  and separation for lower values of . From Figure 1c it becomes clear that
for high values of F Region B prefers union for all values of : separation is then
too expensive.
We summarize the outcomes under majority voting as follows.
Proposition 2. The outcomes under majority voting are given as follows: (a)
F < ga=4 then there will be no union for all  2 [0; 1=2] under majority voting,
(b) if ga=4 < F < ga=2 then there will be union for all  2 [
B
; 1=2] under
majority voting and (c) if ga=2 < F then there will be union for all  2 [0; 1=2]
under majority voting.
The interesting case is when ga=4 < F < ga=2 since in that case union occurs
for  2 [1  2F=ga; 1=2]. Note that the expression 1  2F=ga is decreasing with
respect to F . A rise in the costs of a government will therefore make union more
likely. If the maximum payo of a government g increases then 1   2F=ga will
also increase and union becomes less likely. This also holds for an increase in the
preference intensity a.
3.2 The social optimum.
In this section we characterize the socially optimal level of union and separation.
It is socially optimal to have two independent nations when the increase of the
total payo outweighs the additional costs. The total payo increases because
the individuals will more likely have their preferred type of the public good. The
additional costs are the xed costs of the extra government. Therefore it is only
socially optimal to have two independent nations when the xed costs of the
public good are low. When the smaller region is very small, the total additional
payo of the individuals in that region of having their own government does not
outweigh the additional costs of having an extra government. Therefore it is also
only socially optimal to have two independent nations when the nations do not
dier too much in size.
This analysis is summarized in the next proposition. We dene F
SP
= ga=8
and 
SP
= 1=2 
q
1=4  2F=ga.
Proposition 3. If F > F
SP
then union is the unique optimal outcome; if F <
F
SP
then union is optimal if and only if  < 
SP
; separation is optimal otherwise.
The details of the calculations are given in Appendix A.
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3.3 Majority Voting and Social Optima Compared.
A comparison of the outcomes under majority voting and the social optima re-
veals:
Proposition 4. (i) if F > ga=2 then union is socially optimal as well as the
majority voting outcome for all  2 [0; 1=2], (ii) if ga=4 < F < ga=2 then union
is socially optimal for all  2 [0; 1=2] but separation obtains under majority
voting for all  2 [1   2F=ga; 1=2], (iii) if ga=8 < F < ga=4 then union is
socially optimal for all  2 [0; 1=2] but separation obtains under majority voting
for all  2 [0; 1=2] and (iv) if F < ga=8 then union is socially optimal for all
 2 [0; 1=2 
q
1=4  2F=ga] but separation obtains under majority voting for all
 2 [0; 1=2].
These results are illustrated in Figures 2a-2d
9
.
The eects of changes in F , g and a on the the socially optimal incentives for
union are the same as on the incentives under majority voting. An increase in F
or a decrease in a or g will lead to an increase of the socially optimal incentives
for separation.
It follows from Proposition 4 that there exists excessive incentives for separa-
tion under majority voting: for certain parameter values majority voting obtains
separation but the socially optimal solution is union. The excessive incentives
appear from the fact that the costs of separation are borne equally, but the ben-
ets of separation borne unequally. The costs of separation, F   F= for the
small region and F   F=(1   ), are borne equally by the individuals in each
region because of the lump sum taxation system. The benets of separation of
an individual depend on the location of the individuals. The individuals located
close to the boundary between the regions will loose the most from separation,
and the individuals at the other sides of both regions gain the most from sepa-
ration. The aggregate increase in the payo of these individuals, however, is less
than the aggregate decrease in the payo of the individuals located close to the
boundary between the two regions.
9
Note that F < ga=8 implies 2F=ga < 1=2  
p
1=4  2F=ga and 1   2F=ga > 1=2  
p
1=4  2F=ga (and thus 2F=ga > 1  2F=ga), that F > ga=4 implies 1  2F=ga < 2Fga and
that F > ga=2 implies that 2F=ga > 1 and 1  2F=ga < 0 (and thus 1  2F=ga < 2F=ga).
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union in the social planner’s solution
1/2 1
Figure 2b: ga/4<F<ga/2
no union under 
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union in the social planner’s solution
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Figure 2c: ga/8<F<ga/4
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Figure 2d: F<ga/8
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planner’s solution
A BSP
no union in the social
planner’s solution
0
Figure 2: Majority voting & social optima
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4 Alternative Political Institutions
The previous analysis gives insight into the incentives for separation and union
under majority voting. A comparison with socially optimally outcomes reveals
that there exists excessive incentives for separation under majority voting. This
motivates an examination of alternative political institutions which may help to
mitigate such ineÆciencies.
We start with considering the role of the status quo, which species what
happens when the majority voting outcomes of both regions are dierent. After
that we will look at what happens when just one nationwide referendum is orga-
nized to decide on union and separation. Finally, we examine the prospects for
unequal union: this is an outcome in which one region gives up the inuence on
the location of the government, and thus on the type of the public good.
4.1 Status quo.
In the basic model, we apply the following majority voting rule: in each region, a
referendum is organized over separation and union. When there exists a majority
in favour of union in both regions then union will take place. Otherwise, both
regions keep separate.
As mentioned earlier, this voting rule is realistic when in an initially unied
nation, the central government is too weak or does not want prevent secession
through military means. This voting rule is also relevant when two initially inde-
pendent nations are considering political integration. It is obvious, however, that
these conditions do not need to hold. There may, for example, exist an author-
itarian regime in an initially unied nation which can stop secession supported
by just one region but which can not stop secession supported by both regions.
(When this authoritarian regime is strong enough to prevent secessions always,
then secession will never take place. This outcome is not very interesting and will
therefore be neglected in this text.) A regime in an initially unied nation may
want to prevent secession because, for example, secession means loss of prestige
or lower tax revenues. When such a regime exists, we can apply the following
majority voting rule: in each region a referendum is organized over separation
and union. When there exists a majority in favour of separation in both regions
then separation will take place. Otherwise, both regions keep unied.
16
The attempts of Hungary and Czechoslovakia to leave the former communist-
bloc, for example, was blockaded by the other nations in these bloc. Decades
later, however, when the idea of secession was supported by more nations in the
communist-bloc, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were allowed to leave the bloc.
The rule is also relevant when one region can prevent the other region from
separation or when the constitution leads to union when both regions do not
agree. A region may want to prevent secession because secession would mean
unreasonably high tax rates. Aruba, an island in the Caribean Sea, for example,
is still a part of the Netherlands. The Dutch constitution allows changes in
the status of Aruba if the governments of Aruba and the Netherlands both agree.
Although there was at least a wish by Dutch politicians for an independent Aruba,
this was blocked by the island.
Under majority voting a status quo species what happens when the regions
do not agree. For the majority voting rule used in the basic model the status
quo, or default option, is separation. For the majority voting rule we will now
use, the status quo will be union.
We start by observing that socially optimal outcomes do not change with a
change in status quo rules: The socially optimal solution is independent of the
status quo rule. Hence, the socially optimal solution in the model with union as
status quo is the same as the socially optimal solution in the model with separation
as status quo.
The intuition behind this is straightforward. In the social optimal solution
the decision on union and separation is taken by maximizing total utility and
not by considering a possible dierence in preference of majorities in each region.
The socially optimal solution will therefore not change.
We next observe that the necessary conditions for a majority in favour of union
in a region: The conditions on  for having a majority preferring union in a region
are the same as in Proposition 1. In fact a useful reformulation of Proposition 1
is: There exists an 
A
such that a majority in region A prefers separation if and
only if  > 
A
and there exists an 
B
such that region B prefers separation if and
only of  < 
B
. In the proof of Proposition 1 we determined the conditions on 
for having a majority by comparing the payos of the median voter under union
and under separation. Using the new majority voting rule neither the median
voter nor his utilities are changed, so the conditions on  will also be the same.
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Since we have changed the status quo from separation into union, the existence
of a majority in favour of separation in both regions is crucial. Using the majority
voting rule with union as status quo and using Propositions 1-3, it is easy to
derive Figures 3a-3d. In the next Proposition, we give the exact conditions for
the occurrence of union and separation under majority voting and the socially
optimally outcomes. Propositions 1-4, in combination with the analysis from
Section 3, allows us to state Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. (a) If F > ga=4 then union is socially optimal as well as the
majority voting outcome for all  2 [0; 1=2], (b) if ga=8 < F < ga=4 then union is
socially optimal for all  2 [0; 1=2] but separation obtains under majority voting
for all  2 [2F=ga; 1=2] and (c) if F < ga=8 then union is socially optimal for
all  2 [0; 1=2 
q
1=4  2F=ga] but separation obtains under majority voting for
all  2 [2F=ga; 1=2].
When the status quo is changed from separation into union one might expect
that union becomes more likely. Indeed, union is now the majority voting outcome
for more parameter values. However, a comparison of the above result with the
conditions derived in our eÆciency result suggest that even under this stricter
political institution, excessive incentives for separation persist.
4.2 One nationwide referendum.
In the majority voting rules we studied until now, separate referenda were or-
ganized in each region. However, it is also possible that just one referendum is
organized in an (initially) unied nation to decide on separation or union. If we
interpret a national parliament deciding on break up of a nation as analogous to
a nationwide referendum on union and separation then the vote on the break up
of Czechoslovakia can be seen as an example of this system
10
.
The majority voting rule is also relevant in many dierent situations. For
example, when the decision on separation or union is taken by a parliament with
proportional representation in the unied nation. This was the case in Belgium:
10
Actually there were three votes on the separation agreement: one in the Czech, one in
the Slovak and one in the Czechoslovakian parliament. In all votings there was a majority
in favour of separation. Our result below, Proposition 6, may be interpreted as saying that
either the vote in the Czechoslovakian parliament or the two votes in the Czech and the Slovak
parliaments were superuous.
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Figure 3: Union as status quo
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the transformation from a centralized state into a federation was only possible
when this transformation was supported by a majority in the parliament.
If two separate referenda are held then it will be possible that the results of
these referenda are not the same. It is therefore necessary to specify a status
quo, which denes what happens in that case. When we organize just one ref-
erendum, there is no need to specify a status quo, because both alternatives are
now mutually exclusive.
In the following Proposition, we make clear under which condition separation
is supported in one nationwide referendum.
Proposition 6. There exists a majority in favour of separation in the whole
nation if and only if there exists a majority in each region in favour of separation.
Proof: A majority in each region implies that we have a majority in the
whole nation, so the proof of the if-part of the statement is trivial. The proof
of the only if-part of the statement is more demanding. The only if-part of the
statement is equivalent to: When there does not exists a majority in favour of
separation in at least one region then there does not exists a majority in favour
of separation in the whole nation. There are three dierent cases in which there
does not exist a majority in favour of separation in each region:
Case A There exists neither a majority in favour of separation in region A nor
in region B.
Case B There exists a majority in favour of separation in region A but not in
region B.
Case C There exists a majority in favour of separation in region B but not in
region A.
In case A it is trivial that there does not exist a majority in favour of separation
in the whole nation.
Before discussing the cases B and C, note that
U
II
(
1
2
) = g  
1
2
ga + y  
F
1  
< g + y   F = U
I
(
1
2
) (6)
Using Lemma 1, we know that case B implies that:
U
II
(
1 + 
2
) < U
I
(
1 + 
2
) (7)
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because there does not exists a majority in favour of union in region B. We also
know that
@U
I
(i)
@i
=  ga 8i 2 [
1
2
; 1] (8)
This implies that U
I
(i) is decreasing in i 2 [1=2; (1 + )=2].
@U
II
(i)
@i
= ga 8i 2 [;
1 + 
2
] (9)
This implies that U
II
(i) is increasing in i 2 [1=2; (1 + )=2].
@U
II
(i)
@i
=  ga 8i 2 [
1 + 
2
; 1] (10)
This implies that U
II
(i) is decreasing in i 2 [(1 + )=2; 1].
From expressions (7), (8) and (9) it follows that U
II
(i) < U
I
(i) for all i 2 [1=2; (1+
)=2] and from expressions (7), (8) and (10) it follows that U
II
(i) < U
I
(i) for
all i 2 [(1 + )=2; 1], so U
II
(i) < U
I
(i) for all i 2 [1=2; 1]. Inequality (6) and
the continuity of the utility function in i imply that the individuals suÆciently
close to the individual located at 1=2 prefer union. Hence there does not exist a
majority in favour of separation in case B.
Using Lemma 1, we know that case C implies that:
U
II
(

2
) < U
I
(

2
) (11)
because there exists a majority in favour of separation in region A. We also know
that
@U
I
(i)
@i
= ga 8i 2 [0;
1
2
] (12)
This implies that U
I
(i) is increasing in i 2 [0; 1=2].
@U
II
(i)
@i
= ga 8i 2 [0;

2
] (13)
so U
II
(i) is increasing in i 2 [0; =2],
@U
II
(i)
@i
=  ga 8i 2 [

2
; ] (14)
so U
II
(i) is decreasing in i 2 [=2; ] and
@U
II
(i)
@i
= ga 8i 2 [;
 + 1
2
] (15)
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so U
II
(i) is increasing in i 2 [; 1=2].
From expressions (11), (12) and (13) it follows that U
II
(i) < U
I
(i) for all i 2
[0; =2], from expressions (11), (12) and (14) it follows that U
II
(i) < U
I
(i) for all
i 2 [=2; ] and from expressions (6), (12) and (15) it follows that U
II
(i) < U
I
(i)
for all i 2 [; 1=2], so U
II
(i) < U
I
(i) for all i 2 [0; 1=2]. Inequality (6) and
the continuity of the utility function in i imply that the individuals suÆciently
close to the individual located at 1=2 prefer union. Hence there does not exist a
majority in favour of separation in the whole nation, which proves case C.
Proposition 6 implies that when majorities in both regions prefer separation
there will be two separate countries and otherwise there will be just one country.
This is exactly the same outcome we got under the majority voting rule with
two referenda and union as status quo. Proposition 5 therefore also holds when
we apply the voting rule with one nationwide referendum. The outcomes are
illustrated in Figures 3a-3d. The result on the excessive incentives for separation
and union holds under nationwide referendum also: there still exist excessive
incentives for separation.
4.3 Unequal union.
From the analysis in the basic model it follows that the smaller region (region A)
wants unication when  is small but the larger region (region B) does not want
unication when  is small. In this case for region B the gain of unication,
a lower tax rate, does not outweigh the loss by the change in the location of
the public good. However, for region A the per capita cost of the public good
becomes too large for low values of . Therefore it makes sense for region A to
ask region B for unication under the condition that the location of the public
good will be determined solely by region B. We call this unequal or unconditional
union. In this case, region A gives up their political inuence in the hope of tax
reduction if region B accept unequal union.
There are several examples of this type of unequal union. The Dutch central
bank, for example, copied accurately its monetary policy from the German Bun-
desbank. It can be that the costs of having an own monetary policy are too high
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for a relatively small economy
11
.
We begin by noting that the larger region, Region B, will always accept un-
equal union: the individuals in region B will then have higher utility since there
is reduction in the tax rates while there is no loss of political inuence. In cases
where region B prefers equal union over separation and region A is willing to
accept an unequal union there arises a bargaining problem. To keep matters
simple, in such a case, we will assume that equal union will take place. Under
these conditions, we nd that the outomes are as follows:
Proposition 7. Region A prefers unequal union over separation if and only if
 < 
uu
, where 
uu
= 2F=(ga+ 2F ).
If a majority in region A prefers unequal union then the public good will be
located at (1 + )=2, i.e. in the centre of region B. Now, we state a Lemma
helping us to determine the outcome of majority voting.
Lemma 2. In region A there is a majority in favour of unequal union against
the alternative of separation if the individual in the centre of region A is in favour
of unequal union.
The proof of Lemma 2 can be found in the Appendix A, we present the proof
of Proposition 7.
Proof: Clearly, everyone in region A prefers equal union over unequal union,
therefore, given Lemma 2, there will be a majority in region A for unequal union
if the individual =2 prefers unequal union, i.e., if
U
uu
(

2
) = g  
ga
2
+ y   F > g + y  
F

= U
I
(

2
) (16)
That is, if
 <
2F
ga+ 2F
= 
uu
(17)
This proves Proposition 7.
The parametric restrictions required for unequal union, equal union and separa-
tion are given in Figure 4a-4e
12
. From the previous discussion and from the
11
Another example is Monaco, which has a full customs integration with France, while its
defense is the responsibility of France.
12
Note that  < 2F=(ga+ 2F ) implies F < ga=(2  2) and that ga=(2  2) > ga=4
23
0 1/2 1
Figure 4a: F>ga/2
union
union in the social planner’s solution
UU
1/2 1
Figure 4b: ga /(2-2 )<F<ga/2
union in the social planner’s solution
union
AB UU
unequal union
0
1/2 1
Figure 4c: ga/4<F<ga /(2-2 )
unequal 
union
union in the social planner’s solution
BB
union
UU
no 
union
0
Figure 4: Unequal union
24
1/2 1
Figure 4d: ga/8<F<ga/4
union in the social planner’s solution
no union
BAUU
unequal
union
0
1/2 1
Figure 4e: F<ga/8
unequal union
union in the 
social planner’s solution
BA
no union
SPUU
no union in 
the social 
planner’s 
solution
0
25
Figures it is clear that for certain parameter values unequal union is preferred
over separation by the smallest region. Unequal union then softens the negative
consequences of excessive separation under majority voting. As one might ex-
pect, there will be unequal union when there is a large dierence in size between
the regions.
We note that the nature of eÆcient outcomes remains the same: The socially
optimal solution in the model extended with unequal union is the same as the
socially optimal solution in the basic model. The argument for this is that in a
socially optimal solution it is already possible in the basic model to locate the
public good anywhere.
5 Conclusion
We have examined the incentives of regions to separate or to remain united. We
suppose that there is a xed costs associated with having an independent country.
In each country there are persons with dierent preferences about the nature of
government and a larger country contains greater diversity of opinions concerning
government policy. These assumptions generate a trade-o: in a smaller country
the citizens have to pay higher taxes to support their government but it is more
likely that the government is closer to the people. We have explored the impact
of the size of dierent regions in shaping this trade-o.
We nd that small regions have greater incentives for union, as compared
to large regions. However, on the whole, majority voting generates excessive
incentives for separation. This motivates an examination of dierent institutions
that are used in practice. One arrangement we explore is the possibility of unequal
union: this is an outcome in which one region agrees to hand over all political
inuence to the other region in return for the benet of sharing the government
and thus paying lower taxes. We nd that such unequal union may be in the
interests of dierent regions and also welfare enhancing.
6 Appendix A.
Proof of Lemma 1: The utility function of an individual i under unication is
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given by:
U
I
(i) = g(1  a j
1
2
  i j) + y   F (18)
and under separation it is given by:
U
II
(i) = g(1  a j

2
  i j) + y  
F

(19)
Under unication the partial derivative of utility with respect to location is:
@U
I
(i)
@i
= ga; 8i 2 [0; ] (20)
Under separation this partial derivative is:
@U
II
(i)
@i
= ga; 8i 2 [0;

2
] (21)
Hence utility is linearly increasing at the same rate with respect to the location
of an individual i both in case of separation and unication. Therefore, when the
individual at location =2 prefers separation (unication) all the individuals in
the interval [0; =2] are in favour of separation (unication). The continuity of the
utility function in i implies that the individuals suÆciently close to the individual
located at 1=2 prefer separation (unication) when the individual located at 1=2
prefers separation (unication). Hence there will be a majority in favour of
separation (unication).
A similar argument holds for region B.
Proof of Proposition 3: In the socially optimal solution the sum of all indi-
vidual utilities is maximized. If it is optimal to have just one country, then it will
be socially optimal to choose the location of the public good and the tax level to
maximize:
U
I
=
Z
1
0
U
I
(i)di = g(1  aE(d
i
jl)) + y   E(t
i
) (22)
and if it is optimal to form two governments then it will be socially optimal to
choose the location of the public good and the tax level to maximize:
U
II
=
Z
1
0
U
II
(i)di =
X
x=A;B
s
x
[g(1  aE
x
(d
i
jl
x
)) + y   E
x
(t
i
)] (23)
where E
x
(d
i
jl
x
), s
x
and E
x
(t
i
) are, respectively, the average distance in country
x given the location of the government, the size of country x and the lump sum
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tax level in country x. Since the value of  is exogenously specied, the values of
s
A
and s
B
are  and 1 , respectively. In order to minimize E
x
(d
i
) it is socially
optimal to locate the government in the middle of each country. Hence, E
A
(d
i
),
E
B
(d
i
) and E(d
i
) are, respectively, =4, (1  )=4 and 1=4. Each country has to
nance its own government, therefore E
A
(t
i
), E
B
(t
i
) and E(t
i
) are, respectively,
F=, F=(1 ) and F . Hence, the social utility expressions (22) and (23) can be
rewritten as follows:
U
I
= g(1 
a
4
) + y   F (24)
U
II
= [g(1  a

4
)] + (1  )[g(1  a
1  
4
)] + y   2F (25)
Comparing the total utilities under union and separation determines the choice
for either union or separation. It is better to have one government (one nation)
if and only if U
I
> U
II
:
g(1 
a
4
) + y   F > [g(1  a

4
)] + (1  )[g(1  a
1  
4
)] + y   2F (26)
After rearranging terms, this inequality can be written as
ga
2

2
 
ga
2
+ F > 0 (27)
and this is equivalent with

2
   +
2F
ga
> 0 (28)
Note that this inequality will only have solutions if F < ga=8 = F
SP
.
Inequality (26) is satised for values of  when:
 <
1
2
 
s
1
4
 
2F
ga
(29)
or when
 >
1
2
+
s
1
4
 
2F
ga
(30)
Note that the right hand side of inequality (30) is greater than 1=2. Because 
is, by assumption, smaller than 1=2, we can omit inequality (30). This proves
Proposition 3.
Proof of Lemma 2: Using the arguments of the proof of Lemma 1 we have to
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show that the partial derivative of utility under unequal union with respect to
the location of the individuals is equal to the partial derivatives of utility under
separation and unication on the [0; =2] interval. The utility function of an
individual i with respect to his location i under unequal union is:
U
uu
(i) = g(1  a j

2
+
1
2
  i j) + y   F (31)
Then the partial derivative of utility with respect to location is:
@U
uu
(i)
@i
= ga; 8i 2 [0;

2
] (32)
Hence utility is linearly decreasing by the same rate with respect to the preference
distance in case of separation, unication and unequal union. Therefore, when the
individual at location =2 prefers unequal union all the individuals in the interval
[0; =2] are in favour of unequal union. The continuity of the utility function in
i implies that the individuals suÆciently close to the individual located at 1=2
prefer unequal union when the individual located at 1=2 prefers unequal union.
Hence there will be a majority in favour of unequal union.
A similar argument holds for region B.
7 Appendix B.
One of the assumptions in the basic model is that the initial endowment per
individual is equal in both regions. Wealth dierences in, for example, Belgium
between Flanders and Wallonia, between north and south Italy and between
Norway and the European Union, however, have an inuence on the incentives
for union and separation in these regions. To study wealth dierences across
regions we write the initial endowment of the individuals in region A and in
region B as y
A
and y
B
, respectively. We suppose that these incomes dier by a
factor ,  > 0, and we write y
B
= y
A
. It can be veried that wealth dierences
do not matter when the public good is nanced by lump sum taxes. We therefore
change the system of taxation to proportional taxes. When both regions separate
there are dierent tax levels in each region and when there is union we have one
tax level to nance the public good. One justication for this assumption is
that a dierence in tax-levels between the regions is not sustainable when the
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subject of taxation (e.g. capital or labour) is mobile in a union. If there exists
a tax dierence between the regions in a union then the capital or the labour
will be located in the region with the lowest tax level. It is also possible that the
legislation of a union allows just one tax rate. This leads to three proportional
tax levels: t
A
denotes the tax level under separation in region A, t
B
the same
in region B and t denotes the proportional tax level in a union. Recall that
Proposition 1 tells us that there exists an 
A
such that region A prefers union if
and only if  2 (0; 
A
) and there exists an 
B
such that region B prefers union
if and only if  2 (
B
; 1=2).
Proposition 8. When  increases, 
A
and 
B
will increase. For  > 8F=(8F  
ga) region A always prefers union and for  < (8F   ga)=8F region B always
prefers union.
This Proposition is in line with the idea that it is more attractive to unite
with a rich region than with a poor region: An increase in  implies that the
individuals in region B become relatively richer compared to the individuals in
region A. Union becomes therefore more attractive for region A and less attractive
for the individuals in region B, which is reected by the increases in 
A
and 
B
,
respectively.
Proof of Proposition 8: Note that we can use Lemma 1 in this proof. We
will prove that an increase in  leads to an increase in 
A
. The proof that an
increase in  leads to an increase in 
B
has the same structure as in the 
A
-case
and it is therefore not given. Recall that we restricted  to values between 0 and
1=2. The utility of individual =2 under union is
U
I
(

2
) = g  
ga
2
+
ga
2
+ y
A
 
F
( + (1  ))y
A
y
A
(33)
and under separation
U
II
(

2
) = g + y
A
 
F

(34)
Let U

I
() and U

II
() be the utility of individual =2 under union and separation,
respectively. Like in the standard model, dene 
A
() as
U

I
() < U

II
() for  < 
A
()
U

I
() = U

II
() for  = 
A
()
U

I
() > U

II
() for  > 
A
()
(35)
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Hence, since U

I
() and U

II
() are dierentiable in  for  2 (0; 1=2)
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II
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Next note that at 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(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
II
(()) = 0. Hence,
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This implies that
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Note that @U

II
(
A
())=@ = 0,
@U

I
()
@
=
F (1  )
( + (1  ))
2
> 0 (39)
and recall that
@[U

I
(
A
())  U

II
(
A
())]
@
< 0 (40)
Hence d
A
()=d > 0. This completes the proof.
Proposition 9. The socially desirable outcome does not change when the en-
dowments across regions vary.
Proof: In a social optimum the sum of all individual utilities is maximized.
The utility under union is
U
I
=
Z
1
0
U
I
(i)di =
X
x=A;B
s
x
[g(1  aE(d
i
jl)) + y
x
  t
x
y
x
] (41)
This implies that
U
I
= g(1  aE(d
i
jl)) + y  
X
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x
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= g(1 
a
4
) + y   F (42)
The utility under separation is
U
II
=
Z
1
0
U
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(i)di =
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x
[g(1  aE(d
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jl)) + y
x
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y
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So total utility under separation can be written as
U
II
= [g(1  a

4
)] + (1  )[g(1  a
1  
4
)]  2F (44)
These utilities are equal to the utilities of equations 24 and 25. We can therefore
apply the same analysis as in the standard model.
This Proposition implies that dierences in initial endowments across regions are
irrelevant for the socially optimal outcome in which aggregate utility is maxi-
mized. Moreover, the possibility of choosing dierent taxation systems for com-
pensation or for wealth transfers does not inuence the the socially desirable
outcome.
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